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ABSTRACT 
This study explores corporate governance practices within the context of the Nigerian 
banking industry using instances of corporate governance lapses that resulted in part to the 
Nigerian banking crises. We present multiple case analysis of publicly available documents 
and court papers (in the United Kingdom and Nigeria) to document instances of breach and 
areas of weakness in the existing Nigerian code of corporate governance. We supported these 
with data obtained from multiple sources (using semi-structured interviews, observation and 
further documentary analysis) to explain and yield insight to the motivation behind these 
corporate governance practices. The research’s  theoretical framework adopts theoretical 
triangulation and is designed to extend the present application of institutional theories and 
legitimacy theories to include roles of external and internal institutions, power blocks, and the 
role of legitimacy seeking acts in influencing corporate governance practices. From the case 
analysis, we suggest multiple actors and influences exist to shape the corporate governance 
practices within most commercial banks. These lapses make it possible for dominant actors 
within the organisation to exhibit symbolic compliance while taking advantage of these 
lapses to shareholders detriment. 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial crises, Corporate Governance practices, 
Institutional theories, Family business, Nigeria. 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
As a fall out of the spate of corporate frauds in the last four decades, there has been a 
renewed focus on the role of corporate governance in corporations. This interest has been 
further influenced by the global financial crises which to date has been described as the worst 
in the history of mankind (Greenspan, 2006; Blanchard, 2009). Other similar factors such as 
privatisation, integration, globalisation of trade and Asian financial crises has sustained 
research interest in corporate governance (Betch et al., 2002; Morck et al., 2005; Christopher, 
2010).  
In furtherance of this interest, Claessans and Yurtoglu (2012), posit the financial crises 
highlights weaknesses of corporate governance systems across the world. Corporate 
governance issues as ineffective board over-sight, poor regulatory framework, supervision, 
excessive risk appetite of boards, executive management remuneration and problem of 
powerful directorship still exist in corporations in spite of several policy reforms and 
regulations aimed at curtailing them (Cadbury 1992, Higgs, Sarbanes-Oxley 2002 in the US ,  
CBN and SEC codes in Nigeria). 
While debate on corporate governance and its role in the global crises rages, an agreement 
exists in the literature around corporate governance and finance literature that the 2008-2010 
global financial crises emerged primarily from subprime mortgage crises in the American 
banking industry (Cole and White,2012; DeYoung and Torna,2013; Ng and Roychowdhury, 
2014) resulting in  subsequent collapse of major banks like Freddie MAC and Freddie MAE, 
Lehman brothers and near collapse of the American economy.  Given the interconnectedness 
of international financial system partly resulting from economic and political globalisation, 
the crises rapidly spread to other parts of the world with varied degree of impact (Soludo, 
2009; Lang and Jagtiani, 2010).  The negative impact has thus created a need to re-examine 
the role of corporate governance in banking industry. Given the financial crises indicate 
inherent weaknesses in the present model of corporate governance operated globally. These 
weaknesses may have contributed failed in addressing problems observed in running 
corporations and addressing governance issues in the banking industry and by extension other 
forms of corporations.  
Although there is a significant body of literature on corporate governance (Laportal et al.; 
Shleifer and Vishny,1997; Solomon and Solomon, 2009; Monks and Tricker, 2012), these 
studies however focused mainly on western based models of corporate governance and with 
less attention on banking and specific requirements of the banking industry. The major 
studies of governance in banking are dominated by studies with American and European 
based data and less in the context of emerging markets (Spong and Sullivan, 2007). 
According to Dallas (2011), less than 1% of research on corporate governance is related to 
emerging markets. A large portion of these studies adopt either a comparative study with 
western systems of governance or focus on board and firm performance with corporate 
governance (Ahunwa, 2001) there is thus a need to expand the frontier of corporate 
governance studies as well as examine the unique peculiarities that shape practice of 
corporate governance in emerging markets.  
In the context of Nigeria, an emerging market economy, the issues of corporate governance 
re-emerged following from the banking crises of 1994, 2004 and 2008-2010 in addition to 
frauds in the manufacturing sector (Otusanya, 2010). Common issues of governance 
identified in the banking industry are fraudulent and self serving practices among board 
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management, weak internal controls, ineffective board oversight, poor risk management, 
abuse of credit lending processes and rendition of false returns. Corporate governance lapses  
and insider trading are factors cited  for the crises in Nigerian banking industry (Sanusi, 2008; 
CBN, 2009). As a consequence of these, five banks had to be bailed out to a tune of over 
=N=620billion of public funds and four others declared to be in grave danger of 
liquidation.1Although various reforms and policy interventions have been made to improve 
the level of governance practises in the banking industry (examples are BOFIA,1991; SEC, 
2003 code of governance for Nigerian listed companies, CBN 2006 code of governance for 
banks). However, the extent to which these reforms have addressed governance issues in 
Nigeria (and by extension emerging markets) needs to be re-examined in light of apparent 
failure of corporate governance practices in curtailing previously identified governance lapses 
and the  banking crises in Nigeria. This is necessary as the structure and causes of financial 
crises differs among countries largely because of the relative extent of dependence on the 
global economy. 
To this end, the study is aimed at providing answers to the following research questions: 
1. How has the code of corporate governance in Nigeria addressed problems of 
governance and accountability in Nigerian banks? 
2. To what extent is the Nigerian corporate governance code effective in curbing 
problems of corporate governance in Nigerian banking sector? 
The research questions of the study will be answered through the evaluation of existing 
corporate governance codes in the Nigerian banking industry and with reference to the 
existing governance practices of banks selected for the study. 
1.2 Structure of the Paper 
The remainder of the study is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature on 
corporate governance in the context of developed and emerging countries. This section 
examined factors that shaped the practices of corporate governance in emerging markets. An 
assessment of prior research on corporate governance issues and challenges were discussed in 
this section. Similarly, consideration was given to broad themes and trends that emerged in 
corporate governance research. It examined theories used to study corporate governance and 
the suitability in the context of emerging economies.  An evaluation of theoretical 
perspectives adopted in previous studies was carried out and a critique of these theories in 
light of their suitability in emerging economies was determined. Section three built on the 
identified gaps in literature and developed a methodological approach that will be used to 
answer the research questions.  Consideration was given to the available methodological 
frameworks available for social science research and a selection made based on justification 
of the selected method. Furthermore, the section made a case for the adoption of suitable 
theories for the study of corporate governance in the context of emerging economies. Section 
four considered the political, legal and social context of the Nigerian state and how these 
have influenced the practise of corporate governance in Nigeria. It will consider how the 
                                                          
1 As a result of the Special CBN NDIC examination of 2009 nine banks were declared to be in grave situation. Of 
these, there was a need to inject over 620 billion to five of these banks. The four others were given a time 
frame of 6 months to improve financial positions in light of several underperforming loan portfolio totalling 
4.02 trillion( £16billion(approximate at an exchange rate of £1:=N=250.00) as atDecember2011) AMCON 
(2011).  
4 
 
interplay of local factors has shaped the practise of corporate governance in Nigeria. 
Similarly, it will examine Roles of institutions, structures and systems in place for corporate 
governance regulation in Nigeria. It would highlight how these have shaped the mechanisms 
for corporate governance regulation in Nigeria. The section concludes by highlighting 
provisions of existing codes and regulations on corporate governance in the Nigerian Banking 
Industry. Section five provides a case analysis of instances of corporate governance 
infractions in selected banks in Nigeria. The governance issues were analysed considering the 
provisions of the corporate governance codes. It analysed how these codes were breached and 
required amendments required to avoid repeat occurrence. Section six presents a summary 
and concludes the study by offering possible options based on evidence and theories 
evaluated, for the reform of the system of corporate governance in developing countries. It 
identified areas of limitation(s) and possible areas for future research. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This section reviews existing body of literature on corporate governance by adopting both a 
global and local perspective with a deliberate focus on the banking industry. This is aimed at 
identifying the relevant theoretical frameworks to corporate governance, themes and trends 
which would shape the study. Similarly, the review seeks to identify gaps in existing 
literature and provide a means for formulating a methodological approach that will be 
suitable in answering the research question earlier advanced in section one. To this end the 
section is structured as follows 2.2 examines the multiplicity of definitions on corporate 
governance 2.3 considers the present state of debate on corporate governance with a focus on 
the Anglo Saxon vs. European models, concentrated ownership vs.  Dispersed ownership 2.4 
examines the development of corporate governance practices and attempts to trace the 
development of corporate governance practices and factors that explain the interest and 
growth in corporate governance research. 2.5 examines the study of corporate governance in 
emerging markets section 2.6 examines study of corporate governance in banking and 
attempts to understand the difference between corporate governance requirements of   banks 
and other corporations. Section 2.7 provides a summary and conclusion to the section. 
2.2 Concept of corporate governance 
Corporate governance as a concept has no generally accepted definition. This is largely borne 
out of three factors; firstly it is an interdisciplinary concept with background in law, 
economics, management and finance. Secondly multi theoretical perspectives have been used 
to define the concept. Finally differences in country legal systems and level of investor 
protection account lack of consensus in defining corporate governance (Gnan and 
Montemerlo, 2002; La Portal et al., 1999).  
However, Zingales, (2008), defines corporate governance as a complex set of constraints that 
shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi rents generated by a firm. This definition assumes 
that the essence of corporate governance is to put in place a system that ensures management 
decisions are in line with company and shareholders objective.  
Gourevitch & Shinn, (2005:3) on the other hand defines corporate governance with an 
emphasis on wider significance of issues of corporate governance. They posit that corporate 
governance is an “authority structure of the firm” which lies at the heart of important issues 
in the society….” They identified these issues as education welfare and social mobility. They 
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argued that corporate governance authority structure determines who has claims on the cash 
flows, strategy and allocation of resources of the firm. They further argue that corporate 
governance decisions are outcomes of political decisions shaped by laws, rules, regulations 
and the degree of enforcement of these laws. 
OECD (2004:12) defines a good system of corporate governance to include the needs of the 
society as a whole and not just profits regime. OECD (2004:12) argues  “A good  governance 
regime  helps to assure that corporations  use capital efficiently,….take into account the 
interest  of a wide range of constituencies  as well as the community in which they operate”. 
They further contend that boards should be accountable to the company and shareholders. 
This in turn helps to assure that corporations operate for the benefit of the society. 
Given the above definitions, corporate governance may be perceived as the relationship 
between the corporation and stakeholders that determine and controls the strategic direction 
and performance of the corporation. In support of this, Cadbury,(1991) defines corporate 
governance as the system by which corporations are directed and controlled. 
The study of corporate governance in corporation specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the diverse participants in an organisation (Yin ,2014). Thus, 
corporate governance requires a suitable framework to prevent agency problems between 
shareholders and mangers. 
Basel committee on banking supervision (2010:5) however adopts a banking view to the 
definition of corporate governance defining it as “the manner in which business and affairs of 
banks are governed by  board of directors and senior management …which affects how they  
set corporate objectives, operate the banks business on a daily basis , meet obligation of 
accountability  to shareholders take into account the interest of other  stakeholders”. It further 
contends that banks should “align activities and behaviour with expectation that banks will 
operate in a safe and sound manner, while complying with applicable laws   and protect the 
interest of depositors”.  
2.3 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Corporate governance mechanisms are means by which shareholders can enforce their rights 
and ensure that their interests align with those of managers. Common among these 
mechanisms as identified by Solomon and Solomon (2002) are; Legal environment and law 
enforcement, Board of directors, executive compensation, large shareholdings’ market for 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure (Solomon et al., 2002). Corporate governance 
mechanism refers to the means by which shareholders can hold managers to account. This is 
with a view to protecting their shareholdings and rights. Denis and McConnell, (2003) 
classified these mechanisms as Internal and External mechanisms of Corporate Governance. 
Luo, (2005) in analysing corporate governance in multinationals, however presents three 
main mechanisms of governance classified as; market based culture based and discipline 
based. For the purpose of understanding the mechanisms of corporate governance Dennis and 
McConnell, (2003) classification of corporate governance mechanisms will be adopted for 
the purpose of this study. 
2.3.1 Board of Directors  
The main organ for control of governance in corporations are the board of directors which in 
the traditional Anglo-Saxon model is responsible for monitoring managers on behalf of 
shareholders, ensuring the protection of rights and make for shareholder profit maximisation. 
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The board achieves this objective by a mixture of direct supervision and delegation of it role 
to subcommittees of the board. Two main types of board of directors are predominant in the 
literature of governance i.e. the single tier board as in UK, USA, Nigeria and the two-tier 
board as practised in continental Europe. 
Significant research on the board structure of corporations has been carried out on the 
composition, skills and diversity of board membership, executive remuneration, however, a 
limitation of the board of directors as a mechanism of corporate governance is the inclusion 
of the same managers that it seeks to monitor and control on the board of directors. In other 
instances, the process of nominating directors of company has created an “old boys network” 
where directors pay are determined by other directors on whose board remuneration they 
serve (cross directorship). 
Similarly, in emerging markets where external governance mechanisms are weaker, boards’ 
ability to effectively monitor managers on behalf of shareholders is a fundamental pillar for 
corporate governance. A limiting factor to this however is the concentration and family 
ownership (La potal et al., 1999; Dallas, 2011). 
2.3.2 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure represents another mechanism of control for corporation. The 
composition of equity holders and their size of holdings determine an important element of 
corporate governance as it helps align management objective with those of shareholders. 
However, the extent of manager ownership beyond that of aligning interest with shareholders 
can further serve as an incentive for managers to pursue their own objective contrary to that 
of the shareholders. However from a corporate governance research point the common issues 
that have been studied in the literature include the role of ownership structure in corporate 
governance, the relationship between ownership structure and board performance                
(Shleifer&Vishny,1999; La Portal et al.; Mitton 2002). 
Although, corporate governance mechanisms are argued to be a suitable means of holding 
managers to account, previous research has criticised the extent to which these mechanisms 
are effective checks on accountability. They are argued as failing to account for the interplay 
of social and political considerations inherent in the process of formulating and implementing 
these codes both at national and organisational levels. Marnet (2007) argues that corporate 
governance models are incapable of addressing challenges of corporations as these models 
ignore social and political behaviours inherent in organisations. This argument is supported 
by the view that while corporate governance models may represent appropriate ideals, they 
fail to address the specific problems that faces organisations as evidenced in their inability to 
prevent the financial crises or the spate of frauds in the banks. Similarly, these mechanisms 
fail to consider local and specific country considerations in their formulation and design.  The 
models assume in most cases the corporation is structured in line with the traditional 
American model i.e., a traditional system of dispersed ownership as opposed to the more 
prevalent system of concentrated or family ownership that is more prevalent around the globe. 
(La Portal et al.,1999). 
 
2.4 Corporate governance in emerging economies 
While corporate governance has been widely researched emphasis has naturally focused on 
the emerged markets of Europe America and Asia with less research from emerging markets 
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of Latin America, Asia and Africa. To (Dallas, 2011) less than 1% of research on corporate 
governance are related to emerging markets with most of these studies adopting either a 
comparative study with western systems of governance or focus on board and firm 
performance with corporate governance.  There is a need to expand the frontier of corporate 
governance studies as well as examine the unique peculiarities that shape practice of 
corporate governance in emerging markets. 
The study of corporate governance in Nigeria has an emerging body of literature notable 
among which are Yahaya,1998; Okike 2000, 2007; Yakassai,2001; Adegbite and Nakajima, 
2010; Adegbite and Amaeshi, 2010 Adegbite, 2012.Among these studies common in terms of 
codes issued to date there are the SEC code of 2003, 2011; CBN mandatory code of 2006. 
(Opara, 2011; Angaye and Gwilliam, 2008). These studies adopt either a comparative study 
of governance or an exploratory study of corporate governance practice in the country. 
Opara (2011) for instance examines barriers to issues and implications at a firm level of 
corporate governance practices in Nigeria by means of a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative data. The study identified common barriers as the protection of minority 
shareholders, lack of commitment and responsibility of shareholders, regulatory framework 
and enforcement mechanisms concentration of ownership, transparency and disclosure. This 
view mirrors closely that of Oyejide and Sotibo, (2001). The study’s population is however 
drawn from a mixed sample from Insurance, manufacturing and banking assuming that these 
separate industries have similar governance requirements. This does not make the findings 
applicable to the banking industry as the peculiar nature of banking was not considered by the 
study. Also the study fails to account for societal and political influences on the system of 
governance in Nigeria as the basis of the questionnaire and interview questions were based on 
the OECD corporate governance assessment framework without consideration for peculiar 
context of Nigeria In terms of her governance need and how socio cultural factors influences 
governance mechanisms. 
Adegbite and Amaeshi(2010) examine the influences on corporate governance in sub Saharan 
Africa with a focus on actor and strategies influencing corporate governance practices. They 
argue that corporate governance practices in Nigeria (as most emerging countries) is subject 
to multiple influences of: rating agencies, international organisations whose influence 
determines the model of corporate governance to adopt by corporations in emerging markets. 
They argue using a mixed qualitative research method the predominant adoption of an Anglo-
Saxon model is a subtle imposition foreign agencies without consideration for local factors. 
The regulation of corporate governance in the context of emerging countries is discussed 
considering corruption and social economic problems of these countries.  Mensah et al. 
(2003) posits that corporate governance and accountability are possible solutions to the 
challenges of corporate corruption in emerging markets. This view however fails to recognise 
that corporate governance goes beyond the issues of protecting shareholders and regulation of 
corporation or minimisation of frauds in corporations. Wider issues such as satisfaction and 
participation of labour, customer satisfaction as this focus is rather ignored. Furthermore, it 
fails to give account of wider context of needs of other stakeholders as postulated by the 
stakeholder theory whose interest may be at variance of the shareholders. While the 
stakeholder theory postulates several parties to which a corporation owes obligations it 
however fails to provide a recognition criteria or which interest group is in cases of 
stakeholder conflicts. 
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Corporate governance in Nigeria is significantly influenced by corporate governance 
regulatory practices borrowed by from other jurisdictions notably the UK.  Significantly, the 
SEC code is similar to the UK code of governance and the CBN code of 2006 while also 
bears close semblance in form to the US Sarbanes Oxley act as it provides detailed guidance 
in the requirements of the governance codes while also advocating the existence of principles 
(CBN, 2014; Adekoya, 2010; Adegbite, 2011). 
In terms of those prescribed to her by organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. 
These in most cases are a by product of negotiations and bi lateral agreement aimed at 
providing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country. While the extent to which 
corporate governance adoption has resulted to FDI remains controversial, and is contested, 
Adegbite, (2012), posits that these may have been a product of been over hyped and does not 
tackle the challenges of governance in the country. 
2.5 Banks corporate governance 
While there has been a series of reforms in corporate governance practices in non financial 
sector these reforms may not be applicable to banks given their special nature and the risk 
they face and pose to the financial/economic system. Adams & Mehran (2003) suggested  
that corporate governance for banks differ from other industries as a result of the risk they 
pose to the economy which requires regulators (mainly central banks and Deposit Insurance) 
to put in place standards and rules to make management practices in banks more efficient. 
Two schools of thoughts have thus emerged regarding the regulation of banks these are the 
proponents for a government led regulation and those for a profession or market led 
regulation. Traditionally, the approach to corporate governance regulation for banks involves 
the government regulator relying on statutory authority and standards to promote the interest 
of shareholders and other stakeholders. The main mechanisms used for controlling banks are 
restriction on connected lending, restriction of holding, legal and prudential guidelines. 
 
2.5.1 The special nature of banks 
Banks are considered special as they perform multiple functions in an economy. Traditionally 
banks perform the role of financial intermediation and play important roles in the 
development of economies. Levine (2004) argues that banks exert a “strong impact on 
economic development of countries”. These roles of strong impact is however not sufficient 
reasons to warrant a different set of corporate governance model or principle different from 
those that presently operate for other sectors and industries. 
Caprio and Levine (2002) identify two attributes of banks that make them special and in need 
of greater governance as opposed to the governance of conventional corporation these are: 
a. Greater opaqueness than other corporations 
b. Greater regulation 
Caprio and Levine (2004), argue that both factors account for the inability of conventional 
mechanisms applicable to public corporations to effectively function for banks. They contend 
that the greater opaqueness makes it difficult for equity owners to monitor banks  
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The roles of banks are of importance in any economy as they provide funds to deficit sectors 
of the economy, financial intermediation role, facilitate payment and exchange and are 
regarded as the engine room of growth of emerging countries. Banks assume this role in 
emerging countries which are characterised by weak and underdeveloped capital markets  
(Hawkins and Turner, 2000; Arun, 2003) hence the inability of the capital market to finance 
growth results in banks adopting these roles in emerging countries. The level of importance 
ascribed to banks is also evident in the extent of regulation imposed by regulatory bodies 
around the world. 
Banks in addition to its traditional role of financial intermediation, banks also serves a social 
function which necessitates the required extent of regulation required in the banking industry. 
Soludo (2006) indicates that Nigerian banks account for over 90% of assets in the financial 
system and significant roles in financing economic development of Nigeria (Soludo, 2006). 
2.6 Theoretical perspectives of corporate governance  
The literature of corporate governance has adopted diverse theories in the study of corporate 
governance. This is evident in the diverse theoretical frameworks that have been used to 
define and study of corporate governance. Most of these studies have been based on use of 
multiple disciplinary approaches to understand the concept of corporate governance. Notable 
among these are the agency theory in finance and economics, stakeholder theory from the 
social oriented theoretical school and legitimacy theory from the regulatory/institutional 
school. While these theories approach the subject from multiple and diverse perspectives, 
they analyse same problems and raise similar issues. Solomon (2007:8) puts it thus: “though 
there are marked differences they analyse same problem from different perspectives”.   
Hence this section will examine common used theories in corporate governance and their 
relevance and appropriateness for understanding corporate governance practises in an 
emerging economy as Nigeria. 
2.6.1 Agency theory  
The agency theory approach to corporate governance is based on the consequences of 
separating power between dispersed owners and the management of a corporation. Agency 
theory assumes that managers (agents) will not carry on business in interest of principals 
except corporate governance mechanisms are in place to reduce tendencies of managers 
acting in self interest of both parties. Hence there is a need to align managers’ interest with 
those of principal (Shareholder). This theory suggests that corporate governance as a means 
of ensuring minimisation of managers’ opportunistic behaviours by ensuring that board exists 
to monitor the activities of managers and align it with the interest of shareholders. (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Phan and Yoshikawa, 2000; Clarke, 2004). The 
agency theory is based on two fundamental assumptions: It assumes that managers are 
opportunistic and self-serving. To resolve this, there is thus a need for strong director 
monitoring through the board of directors to ensure an alignment of shareholders and 
managers interests.  The second assumption of the agency theory is that it assumes agents 
control the information flow to principal thus allowing for opportunistic behaviours to the 
detriment of shareholders.  
Although the agency theory is widely used in corporate governance research, it has been 
criticised for reducing the corporation to relationship between the manager (agent) and 
shareholder without consideration to other groups excluded by the agency contractual 
relationship. While it has been argued that agency theory has been helpful in the study of 
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corporate board, executive remuneration, role and functions of board of directors, it also fails 
to account for sociological and psychological mechanisms inherent in the principal agent 
relationship (Carreaux, 2004). 
2.6.2 Stakeholder theory 
The Stakeholder theory is an attempt to broaden the scope of accountability of corporations 
from the shareholder group to include considerations for other groups in the society beyond 
those defined by the agency theory. Emerson et al. (2011) affirms that stakeholder theory is 
an interdisciplinary theory widely used in the field of corporate social responsibility and 
business ethics. Although the theory was initially designed as a theory for use in management, 
it has been widely adopted in the field of corporate governance (Gibson, 2000; Wolfe and 
Putler, 2002; Friedman and Miles, 2006). By defining the firm as a network of interconnected 
relationships it emphasises the need for consideration and extension accountability to the 
interests of it diverse stakeholders, and seeks to explain internal behaviour as well as external 
relationships (Key, 1999) 
SHT views the corporation as a set of relationships “explicit and implicit” across the 
environment (internal and external) of an organisation. This is achieved by focusing on other 
members of the society, as opposed to traditional focus on shareholders or owners of the 
corporation. 
Freeman (1984), (as cited by Key 1989) defines stakeholders as ‘individuals or groups that 
may affect or is affected by the organisational objectives’. This definition creates an endless 
list of whom and what can be classified as a stakeholder and the extent of obligation owed to 
that group. This throws up a challenge of criteria to determine who qualifies as a stakeholder. 
Clarkson, (1995), provides a guideline in classifying stakeholders by highlighting three main 
factors determining stakeholder relationship. These are the organisation, other actors and 
nature of company- actor relationship. On the other hand, Lepineux, (2005), classifies 
stakeholders on the basis of shareholder, internal stakeholder and community. This helps 
clarify and possibly rank the extent of obligation owed to each group. This classification 
enable for understanding relationships in the banking industry. However, stakeholder theory 
fails to provide for political and social interactions that shape demand of groups of 
stakeholders. Neither does the theory account for the whole system within which organisation 
operate and how identified stakeholders are linked with the corporation other than they are 
affect and or affected by classification (Key, 1999).  
Furthermore, Key, (1999), argues that the stakeholder theory lacks a theoretical basis for 
explaining firm behaviour, an essential requirement for understanding corporate governance 
practices in specific sector or country context. In the context of corporate governance for 
instance, stakeholder theory provided no explanation as to how socio-political and culture can 
shape the governance practise of a firm. 
While there is a wide use of stakeholder theory in the literature of corporate governance it has 
been criticised both in the wider literature of management and corporate governance for 
failing to provide a prescription to determine the extent of accountability owned stakeholder 
groups. This is a result of its lack of definition of what constitute a stakeholder, and to whom 
a corporation is accountable other than the affect/affected by criteria. Similarly, in cases of 
stakeholder conflict it does not provide for what legitimate right is owed a group or which 
group is more important, extent of obligation owed or means of resolving conflict of interest 
between groups of stakeholders when interests are at cross purposes. Hence there is a need 
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for the theory to provide an explanation for the linkages that exists between groups of 
stakeholders and how the firm can resolve the conflict between these groups. 
2.6.3 Legitimacy theory 
The legitimacy theory assumes that a social contract exists between an organisation and the 
society. Corporations attempt to gain legitimacy by taking actions that portray it as 
complying with societal norms and values. Legitimacy theory is widely used in corporate 
disclosure studies and environmental reporting (Degegan,2002; O’donovan, 2002). However, 
few scholars have adopted it to explain corporate governance disclosure practices. In the field 
of corporate governance notable research using the legitimacy theory include (Aguilera and 
Curevo Cazzura, 2004; Qui and Luung, 2006; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2008:12) argue the adoption of CG codes is symbolic and intended to 
impress investors on one hand and deter regulators from formulating more stringent 
regulation for an industry. This position was further strengthened in Zatoni and Cuomo, 
(2010), where they identify two views that explain the introduction of corporate governance 
codes in countries i.e. 
(1) That corporate governance codes are introduced to improve performance of 
corporations, and 
 (2) That the codes are adopted to legitimize listed companies and capital markets. 
Legitimacy according to Suchman, (1995:574) is ‘a generalised perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms values beliefs and definitions’. While these values and systems are subject 
to change, organisations will seek means of survival by reference to a third party (ies) 
regarded by the society as possessing legitimacy (Deegan and Bloomgust, 2006).  Legitimacy 
is a social construct and what is considered legitimate varies between societies with varied 
measure of what is considered legitimate and social perception of corporate behaviour 
(Suchman,1995). 
In the context of corporate governance, the choice of what model, practise and mechanism a 
firm or country adopts is an attempt to gain legitimacy in the environment in which the 
company operates. Hence corporations are posited to only adopt those practices that foster 
and improve its societal legitimacy rather than efficiency, accountability or transparency. 
This to Deegan and Uneram, (2011), is an attempt by an organisation to be perceived as 
operating within the ‘norms and bounds of their respective societies’ 
The legitimacy theory is founded on the notion of a social contract containing implicit and 
explicit expectation of a society in the organisation Deegan and Unermam, (2011). 
Legitimacy theory assumes that organisations are allowed to continue operations provided the 
company comply with the terms of the social contract. Where there is non-compliance, it is 
likely to result in difficulty in assessing resources required for continued survival. 
 In banking this theory is of importance as it enables a trust and integrity building to take 
place between the bank and the society and enables a reassessment of compliance with the 
terms of the social contract. A bank may legitimise its actions by adopting a corporate 
governance mechanism which employs an independent director to its board. This may appeal 
as right to the society it does not assure that it will improve its accountability or management 
transparency. 
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Hence policy and systems disclosure will be based on efforts aimed at fostering legitimacy in 
the society. The expectation of an organisation is often shaped by the extent of societal 
expectation which is a product of societal knowledge culture and belief.  
2.6.4 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory assumes that organisations will adopt similar practices as those adopted 
by other organisations in an industry. 
The foundation of the Institutional theory is based on the works of Di Maggio and Powell, 
(1983), who defined institutional theory as the forms organisations take and why 
organisations within a particular “organisational field” tend to adopt similar characteristics 
and forms ( Larrinaga and Gonzalez, 2007). They argue that organisations behaviour is 
driven by the institutional framework within which it operates. Thus, institutional theory 
assumes organisations seek to conform its behaviour and practices to similar organisations, 
industry regulation or mandates. 
The theory presents three means by which an organisational behaviour achieves similarities 
(i.e. isomorphism) these are discussed below: 
Coercive pressure i.e. coercive isomorphism which indicates a fear of a group(s) of 
stakeholders to which an organisation is dependent on for survival hence it assumes on the 
basis of a stakeholder theory that organisations will voluntarily adopt corporate governance 
mechanisms that addresses the concerns and fears of major stakeholder group(s). 
Mimetic isomorphism refers to a desire by organisations to copy or improve upon 
institutional practices of other organisations regarded as models or benchmark to either gain 
competitive advantage or legitimacy (Deegan and Unerman, 2011). 
The third category refers to normative isomorphism where group norms pressurise 
organisations to adopt certain institutional practices. It assumes normative theorists seek to 
professionalize the organisation e.g. accountants and auditors. 
The last concept in Institutional theory refers to decoupling which alternate form of 
isomorphism which assumes while there may be a need for organisations to adopt certain 
institutional practises; the actual implementation may differ from the formally sanctioned 
process and procedures. Deegan and Uneraman (2011) argue that an organisation can 
decouple actual practises from institutional practises hence organisation might adopt some 
process for publicity purposes rather than for improving accountability or transparency of the 
corporation. 
2.7 Summary  
This section has reviewed the literature on corporate governance drawing on previous 
research in advanced and emerging economies. The review has shown that over time the 
nature and form of organisation has evolved and has resulted in a demand for greater 
accountability by the state and a larger pool of stakeholders. While the traditional argument 
for governance was to resolve the agency problem the modern corporation has brought up 
more challenges than was previously known. 
In the case of emerging countries, a desire to finance the huge costs of infrastructural 
development requires countries to seek an enabling environment that stimulates FDI to make 
such economies attractive destination for foreign investors. Hence countries like Nigeria 
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through multinational agencies as IMF, OECD, IBRD are required to put in place relevant 
laws that replicate the regulatory environment in the parent countries.  
Similarly, the review of the literature has highlighted that research into corporate governance 
has been focused in advanced and leading economies of the world with research in emerging 
countries far between. Similarly, most research on corporate governance are either country 
specific with a fewer number examining specific industries in the context of governance 
practices and the extent of their actual implementation in practice.  The literature provides 
broad provisions on the mechanics for good corporate governance without specific study in 
the context of emerging markets on the requirements of governance mechanisms that address 
the peculiar needs of financial sector.  
 
3 Research methodology and method 
3.1 Introduction 
Research methodology is defined as the general approach that is taken to an enquiry as 
opposed to research methods which are the specific methods adopted in individual studies. 
(Saunders, 2009). 
  Remennyi et al., (2003)  define methodology as the “overall approach to a problem which 
could put into practice in a research process from the theory  underpinning the collection and 
analysis of data” Similarly Collins and Hasey,(2009) view methodology as “ the overall 
approach to the entire process of research study”  there is  a need to distinguish between  
research method  which provides a  guide to data source and analysis relevant to the research 
question while methodology refers to the philosophical perspective on which the research 
work is based. 
This section will thus provide insight and justification for the research methodology and the 
research methods adopted to address the research question. The section is structured in line 
with Saunders et al., (2009), research methodological approach. The followings form the sub-
titles of discourse in this section methodology, approaches to research, philosophical 
approach, theoretical framework, research methods (data collection and analysis methods) 
and summary of the section. 
3.2 Methodology and Philosophical approaches of research 
This section will discuss the three main philosophical approaches to research as proposed by 
Hallenbone and Priest, (2007). The following section discusses the three philosophical 
perspectives underpinning the social sciences research: interpretive, positivism and the 
critical theory, beginning with the interpretive approach.  
3.2.1    Positivist approach 
Positivism as an approach to research has as its origin in the works of French philosopher 
Auguste Comte and it assumes that reality can be objectively determined and measured in a 
manner independent of the researcher. It is further argued that the predominant use of 
quantitative data by positivists follows the ontological belief that reality is external and can 
be objectively determined (Bryman, 2008). Generally, positivists adopt the use of quantitative 
data in carrying out research, it does not preclude the use of qualitative data for positivist 
research it is assumed that with positivist research, there is a possibility for the outcome of 
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the research to be either generalized or replicated in other areas of research through the use of 
models or similar models (Myers, 2009).  
 Positivist approach believes that there is a fixed prior relationship within phenomena which 
is capable of reliable measurement. This belief follows the natural science that relies on the 
testing of hypotheses developed from pre-existing theory (ies).  As such, Positivist research is 
thus a theory testing approach to research which usually follows the deductive method of 
reasoning (Saunders et al 2009). Positivists argue that testing theories facilitates an increased 
and predictive understanding of phenomena. (Myers, 2009). 
A positivist researcher is argued to be “independent of the subject of the research” he neither 
affects nor is affected by the subject of the research (Remmery et al., 1998, p.3). A positivist 
research is believed to be fair, unbiased and less subjected to influence of the researcher of 
the subject of the research. Generally, positivists adopt the use of quantitative data in carrying 
out research; this does not however preclude the use of qualitative data for positivist research. 
It is assumed that with positivist research, there is a possibility for the outcome of research to 
be either generalized or replicated in other areas of research through the use of models or 
similar models.  
The positivist approach is however declined in this study for its generalization of positive 
results in some instances as a general form of universal statements of truth does not fit with 
the researcher view that truth is subject to the political and social context within which a 
phenomenon is studied. 
3.2.2 Interpretive approach 
The interpretive approach is perceived differently by various scholars, which has contributed 
to the better understanding of it. Myers (2009) remarks that the essence of an interpretive 
research is to facilitate an in depth understanding of the context of a phenomenon as context. 
Similarly, Husseri (1965 cited in Kelhhar 2005) asserted that an interpretive approach is 
based on the belief that reality is a product of social construction and cannot be objectively 
determined and measured. This assertion is based on the philosophy that knowledge “…..is a 
product of social practices and institutions or of interactions and negotiations between 
relevant social groups” (Gasper, 1999, p.855).This approach of research is used to understand 
socially constructed realities Hallenbone and Priest (2009). In a similar vein, Blaikie, (1993), 
posits that an interpretive approach as that of an “anti-positivist that views the nature of 
reality has been socially constructed and subjective. Saunders et al. (2009) state that the 
essence of this approach is to seeks to understand the difference between individuals as social 
actors. 
Also, interpretivists are known to perceive events in the light of experience and expectations 
thus the meaning attached to an event is a product of constant constructions and 
reconstructions developed by experience which brings about varied interpretations under 
which people act.  However, the essence of an interpretive research is to facilitate an in depth 
understanding of the context of a phenomenon as context i.e. ‘what defines the situation and 
makes it what it is’ (Myers, 2009:39). Thus, Knowledge is a product of in depth study and 
understanding of the context of a phenomenon, but also involving the social actors and a deep 
understanding of his perspective. 
An interpretive research is based on the belief that reality is a product of social construction 
and not objectively determined (Husseri,1965 as cited by Kelhhar (2005). An interpretive 
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approach allows a researcher to place actors in their social context which brings about an 
understanding of their activities (Hussey, 1997). To Neuman, (2011), Interpretivism tends to 
apply a transcendent perspective to research. Transcendent perspective entails going beyond 
ordinary material experiences and perceptions. It entails going beyond the surface or 
observable to the inner and subjective level of human experience. 
Although interpretive research is usually attached to researches of qualitative nature, 
Emksson and Kovalainen, (2008). Myers (2009) however argues that an interpretive 
philosophy does not necessarily imply a qualitative research as the basic philosophy will still 
be dependent on the underlining assumption of the researcher. He thus suggests that 
interpretive research can be either qualitative of quantitative. 
3.2.3   Critical approach 
Myers (2009) posits that in the field of management research, critical approach, though not as 
prominent as positivism and interpretivsim, yet, has continued to gain increased prominence. 
Critical research is aimed at encouraging change in the society by challenging the status quo 
and exposing deep seated contractions within the social system and thereby transforming 
these alienating and restrictive social conditions (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991).  However, 
some of the prominent issues the critical research focuses on are; social injustice, 
environmental sustainability and open democracy and as argued by Myers, (2009). These 
factors form the “ethical basis” that motivates a critical research. 
 In a similar manner, Hallenbone and Priest, (2009) argue that critical research adopts a 
dialectical analysis that reveals the historical, ideological and contradictory nature of existing 
social practices. Hence, critical research is designed to examine a phenomenon and develop 
theories to address the problems observed in the society and proffer suitable solutions to these 
problems. 
Similarly, Neuman, (2011) argues that the primary purpose of a research is not simply to 
study the social world; it is aimed at changing it by revealing sources of inequality and 
empowering people for change. This for the critical researcher implies reality is constructed 
of multiple layers of reality this is based on the adoption of critical realist ontology. 
However, going from the above analysis and given the research questions put forward, both 
the positivist and interpretive theories will not be appropriate for the study as this study does 
not aim to detach itself from the phenomenon it tends to examine or being descriptive or 
represent the phenomena as it exists. But the researcher is assuming to be part of the 
phenomenon being studied and attempts to advocate better means of regulating corporate 
governance in the Nigerian banking.  
3.3 Methods  
To answer the research question of the study a case study approach will be adopted. A case 
study approach method of research is more amenable for a descriptive or exploratory study 
and seeks to place emphasis on a full contextual analysis of fewer events or conditions and 
their interrelations for a single subject (Yin ,2014; Bryman & Bell,2008). 
Case study method of research is focused on exploring a single entity or phenomenon 
bounded by time and activity and collects data using a variety of data collection procedures 
over a period of time (Creswell,1994; 12). According to Yin,(2014), case study is defined as 
an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
distinguishing  between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident¨.  Case study deals 
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with technically distinctive situation, relies on multiple sources of evidence, and benefits 
from prior development of theoretical prepositions to guide data collection and analysis. Yin 
(2014) identified case study as the preferred research strategy when phenomenon and context 
are not readily distinguishable.  Although, case study research strategy is considered for use 
in single cases, Dul and Haks,(2008:4), consider case study as amenable for use in single 
cases or small number of cases. (I.e. multiple cases) 
While case study research is more often associated with contemporary phenomenon 
(Saunders, 2009, Dul and Hak, 2008; and Yin, 2014). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argue 
that case studies can also be historical in nature. The definition put forward by Collis and 
Hussey, (2009), identified some of the discernible characteristics of case study strategy. They 
defined case study as a method that is used to explore a single phenomenon in a natural 
setting using a variety of methods to obtain in-depth knowledge. Hence, where depth 
knowledge is required a case study is capable of utilising multiple research techniques to 
facilitate a study of phenomenon.  
In spite of its highlighted advantages, the case study research is criticised for its lack of rigor, 
and difficulty to generalise beyond the case study in reference. Cooper and Schindler 
(2001:13), criticises the case study method for using qualitative data which results in an 
unclear acceptance or rejection criteria. While these criticisms are valid, its ability to generate 
in depth knowledge on a phenomenon makes case study acceptable for the research. It 
similarly allows for the proposed use of multiple data sources as proposed by the research. 
The criticism of case study research will however be addressed by using documentary 
evidence to support evidences obtained from selected cases. 
 However, this study adopts case study approach to carry out the proposed case analysis. The 
choice of case study was selected as it allows the answers of the research question that 
focuses on the how and why of corporate governance practise in the context of Nigerian 
banking industry. It also allows for an independent study without manipulation of variables 
The above discussions point out that case study strategy has been and can be used 
successfully use to conduct research on corporate governance. Hence it can be argued that 
case study strategy, where in-depth knowledge can be obtained, suits the study of corporate 
governance that has varied views and practises across countries, industries and firms; as 
noted in the previous section, corporate governance is a social political construct, which 
varies according to context hence conclusive generalisations are difficult to make. 
A case study research strategy accommodates multiple data source data collection and 
analysis, these factors enables a researcher to satisfactorily answer the research questions 
using diverse range of data and analysis tools. (Yin, 2014) Secondary data /documentary 
review as data collection technique, with content analysis and quantitative analysis adopted 
for data analysis. (Matthews, 2005). 
Alternate strategies like experiments defined by Bryman and Bell,(2003:39) as a research 
design that rules out alternative explanations to findings derived. This is done by having an 
experiment group and a control group from it were considered less suitable   as the study has 
no control over the phenomenon been studied and does not aims at the manipulation of the 
dependent and independent variables. (Collis and Hussey, 2009; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012) 
the use of a control group is not possible in this study as the corporate code of governance 
been studied is made mandatory for the Nigerian banking industry hence a control group that 
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is a commercial bank that does not apply the principle of corporate governance is not 
available to the researcher. 
Alternatively, the survey strategy commonly associated with the deductive approach 
(Saunders et al., 2009), and positivist philosophical positioning (Bryman and Bell 2008; 
Collis and Hussey, 2009). Would have been suitable but this research leans towards 
Interpretive and adopts a more inductive approach, thus, survey strategy was deemed 
inapplicable to this research.  
Ethnography requires the researcher to be immersed in a setting, and become part of the 
group under study to understand the phenomenon being studied (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
As the researcher was outside to the context in this research, banking, ethnography falls off as 
a strategy of research. 
Grounded theory seeks to develop a well-integrated set of concepts that provide a thorough 
theoretical explanation of phenomena under study (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). In grounded 
theory, theory is derived from data, systematically gathered and analysed through the 
research process in an iterative process (Bryman, 2008).  
Grounded theory perhaps can be identified as the next best alternative for this research, due to 
the nature of research questions being asked. However, this research seeks to explore 
corporate governance in a real-life context and examine how the issues of corporate 
governance have shaped the practice of governance in emerging markets, and apply existing 
theories as opposed to generating theories or theoretical models on corporate governance 
practices. Hence, grounded theory is deemed less suitable, when compared to the case study 
strategy. As noted in the review of the literature grounded theory method has been adopted by 
(Yahaya 2001; Goddard, 2004; Solomon and Solomon, 2006) 
3.4 Methods of data collection  
In order to facilitate an understanding of corporate governance mechanism and practices in 
Nigerian banks, documentary evidence will be gathered from   sources as newspapers, 
magazines, public records annual financial statements of selected banks (from 2006 to 2013) 
and  regulatory reports within a similar time frame. To enable a qualitative analysis, archival 
data will be used to establish patterns and trends that have shaped practice and regulation of 
corporate governance in Nigeria banking industry. This is with a view to identify key 
corporate governance lapses and how these lapses have been perpetuated.  
However, the adopted data collection method i.e. archival and documentary records throw up 
a challenge of credibility of document sources.  The limitation of this method 
notwithstanding, the study will make use of the method as it will provide evidence to support 
the arguments put for and provide evidence to answer the research question. To reduce this 
bias, an attempt will be made to analyse the issues and documents from a perspective of 
corporate governance to understand the specific issues of corporate governance that is at hand 
or what governance mechanism was absent or ineffective in preventing the corporate 
governance lapse 
Alternative sources of data collection that could have been adopted for the research such as 
questionnaire survey are rejected as these will limit the depth of the study to only variables 
that can be measured and recorded in quantitative terms. Since, the purpose of the research is 
not to measure public perception or extent of awareness of corporate governance practices 
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but to attain an in-depth understanding of corporate governance issues in the context of social, 
political culture of Nigeria. 
Observation is similarly rejected as a method of observation give the subjectivity associated 
with its interpretation. As Anderson,(1983), argues reliance on observation as a means of 
study is error prone and will affect the outcome of research. This argument extends to the 
interpretation and analysis of data which cannot be totally detached from the subjectivity of 
the researcher or the environment as the choice of topic and method of research is a 
subjective choice. 
3.5 Method of data analysis  
To facilitate an analysis of the research data a theme analysis method will be used to analyse 
and summarise the data collected from the financial statements, interviews and documented 
records. This classification will make for easy analysis of the gathered data. The data will 
thus be used to analyse two Nigerian Banks to highlight what factors resulted in the frauds 
that occurred and how this can be understood in the context of corporate governance and the 
issues in terms of regulatory weakness that accounted for the frauds in these banks 
4. Country Context 
4.1 Background of Nigerian banking industry. 
Nigeria is the second largest economy on the African continent is regarded as the most 
populous black nation on earth with a population estimate of over 185 million people as at 
2016(World bank, 2016). In terms of her economic index, Nigeria has a GDP of $481.066bn 
as at December 2015(World Bank, 2016). Nigerian operates a mixed economic system that 
involves a dominant public sector and a less dominant government regulated private sector. 
(Ahunwa 2011, NPC 2011). While the country has embarked on a deliberate economic 
reform and deregulation and privatisation, the public sector still retains its dominance of 
Nigerian economy. 
 Nigerian economy is an export dependent economy with a large proportion of its export 
proceeds derived  from oil and gas industry in spite of several attempts at diversifying the 
economy, oil retains a major role in the economy accounting for over 90% of all foreign 
exchange proceeds and over 80% of all budgetary revenues.(CIA fact book 2011; 
CBN,2011NBS 2010) Major trading partners of Nigeria include the USA which accounts for 
28.9% India 12% and Brazil4.2% of all exports while China USA and Holland account for a 
largest position of imports to the country in the proportion 17.5%,9.1% and 4.9% respectively. 
4.1.1 Nigerian political system 
The Nigerian political system is a presidential system with a thirty six-state structure with an 
executive president and a bi-cameral legislature. The majority of socio economic polices are a 
creation of the military that has dominated governance in the country for a period of over 
three decades of it’s 56 years existence as an independent nation. As noted by Otusanya, 
(2011), successive military incursion into the political and economic administration of the 
country has resulted in “de-emphasis on accountability” and institutions that fail to encourage 
democratic accountability. As a result, institutions as the judiciary, stock exchange and the 
central bank do not have in place adequate enforcement mechanisms capable of challenging 
the interest of its political class or military hierarchy.  A comparative study of leading stock 
exchanges in Africa indicates that Nigeria is far behind in terms of major market indices and 
19 
 
does not compare with others notwithstanding a high concentration of industries and a higher 
national income. (Uche, 2007). 
 
4.1.2 Legal system 
 The Nigerian legal system is a product of it colonial history as her legal system closely 
mirrors that of the British system. The main code for company regulation on Nigeria is the 
Companies and allied Matters Act of 1990 (CAMA as amended to date) as well as the SEC 
codes for companies listed on her stock exchange.  Thus, in theory the same rules are 
applicable to shareholders in terms of protection the extent to which this is implemented is 
different from what obtains in western countries. (Anganye and Gwilliam 2008). 
 
4.2 Pre-colonial and colonial history of banking in Nigeria 
The history of banking in Nigeria commenced in   1892 with the establishment of Nigeria's 
first bank, the African Banking Corporation. Prior to this time traditional means of banking 
existed which were the communal cooperative societies that entailed contribution to joint 
cooperative societies. (CBN 2014; Okezie et al, 2001). Formal legislation in banking 
commenced in  1952,  with the banking ordinance of 1952 which brought about introduction 
of legislation requiring banks  have among others, required reserves, and formal examination 
by the banking department of the federal ministry of finance. At this stage, Nigerian banking 
was dominated by three foreign banks   namely  (the Bank of British West Africa, Barclays 
Bank, and the British and French Bank) and two indigenous banks (the National Bank of 
Nigeria and the African Continental Bank) the ownership and structure of these banks were 
predominantly to  facilitate colonial trade with little contribution for the development of the 
local and indigenous community or local involvement and or participation in the  
management of these banks. Uche and Ehikwe (2001) avers that British colonial officials 
established the West African Currency Board in 1912 to help finance the export trade of 
foreign firms in West Africa and to issue a West African currency convertible to British 
pounds sterling. These banks with the support of the colonial administration failed to 
encourage failed to develop the existing indigenous financial institutions.  
Flowing form the reluctance of foreign dominated banks to finance development of 
indigenous economy and financial system and a growing national consciousness culminated 
in the quest for the establishment of the Nigerian central bank on July 1 1959.  As with the 
structure of governance and administration in Nigeria, the CBN roles and functions was 
modelled significantly after that of the Bank of England with functions including; 
establishing the Nigerian currency, controlling and regulating the banking system, serve as 
banker to other banks in Nigeria, and carry out the government's economic policy. During 
this era, bank ownership was dominated mainly by foreign owners as evident in the three 
main banks in operation at that time Barclays bank and British bank of West Africa. A 
significant attainment in this period was the establishment of the central Bank of Nigeria 
which had the mandate to regulate the practice of banking and grant licensing to banks 
operating in the country. 
 
4.2.1 Post-independence period 
By her independence from the British in 1960, Nigerian banking landscape had not changed 
much from what it was as the focus of the government was on economic stability as well as 
achieving political and Economic stability of the country.  Within the first decade of her 
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existence the ethnic and tribal polarisation of the county culminated in a thirty-month civil 
war. During this period, ownership and control of banking remained largely in the hand of 
foreigners who retained 100% stake in these banks with minimal government regulation 
beyond monetary policy and without an indigenous company law to regulate the operations 
of these banks (Uche,1988). 
 
By the mid 1970’s the oil boom era had commenced and along with his came a desire by the 
Nigerian government to regulate and control the banking system this was achieved by the 
nationalisation of three major foreign banks in operation in the country. At this time, the 
nationalised banks accounted for over 67% of total assets, 70%of total deposits and over 50% 
of branch offices, loans and advances in the banking system (CBN 2015, Nwankwo, 1980 as 
cited by Uche, 2001). The policy trust of the government was to ensure that the banks 
operated in the overall interest of the economy and the benefit of Nigerians.  The government 
take over however exposed several of these banks to the inefficiency and corruption that has 
characterised the Nigerian public sector. However, as a result of the oil glut and decline in the 
economic fortune of the country, corruption and greed of the political class the country 
embarked on a Structural Adjustment programme on the advice of the International monetary 
fund to curb the inefficiencies associated with the public sector and rationalize the role of the 
public sector (CBN, 1995) 
The implication of the SAP was the need for government to divest its ownership of the 
nationalised banks and the as a result the government liberalised banking licensing process 
leading to a boom in the number of banks in the country from the period of 1985 for instance 
the number of banks in the country grew from 41 to 120. This highlights the influence of 
foreign practices on the Nigerian banking industry as the structure upon which the banking 
system is built is essentially a foreign shaped one. 
 
The Nigerian banking industry is a relatively new one with the first bank African  Continental 
Bank  ACB established in 1892 .(Okezie et al.,2011,CBN 2000,2006)  The main regulator of 
the Industry is the Central bank of Nigeria, other regulators are the  Securities and  Exchange 
Commission and Nigerian Stock Exchange for listed banks, the Nigerian Deposit insurance 
Corporation , Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit and the Economic and Financial Crimes 
commission(EFCC), Corporate Affairs commission) and  consists of  Commercial banks , 
micro finance Banks , Bureau de change  Discount houses and Mortgage Institutions. As of 
date there are twenty four commercial and merchant banks, five discount houses, six 
development institutions and thirty five primary mortgage finance institutions (CBN 
2015,2014; ICR 2011;NDIC 2014) over the years the baking industry has however been 
plagued by series of crises that are as old as the industry itself. From the early failures and 
liquidation of virtually all indigenous banks to the near liquidation of 2009. Between 1947 
and 1952, of the 25 indigenous banks in operation in the country 21 either liquidated or failed. 
Between 1991 and 1996, several of the banks that emerged as a result of the post 
liberalisation era were either liquidated or closed shop. During this era, it was adduced that 
problems of family ownership, regulatory gaps, insider abuses and skill gaps accounted for 
these failure (CBN 1998; Financial Nigeria 2006 and NDIC 2008). While several of the 
factors have been regulated on by successive administration and prudential guidelines they 
remain dominant problems of the industry (Soludo, 2006; Sanusi, 2009; CBN 2011,2015). 
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4.2.3 Post bank consolidation era. 
The Nigerian banking industry in terms of regulation the most regulated industry in Nigeria 
(ROSC, 2004; Okezie, 2009). Central bank of Nigeria regulates through policies and 
prudential guidelines issued on a regular basis. (NDIC 2011; CBN 2014). Similar regulations 
for the Nigerian banking industry are the NDIC, SEC NSE and EFCC and NFIU. The 
effectiveness of these regulations is however curtailed by other societal and institutional 
weakness that has prevented implementation and enforcement of the guidelines. The Nigerian 
legal process is very slow, which discourages regulators from taking any legal recourse in 
enforcing compliance with corporate governance provisions (ROSC, 2004). This is coupled 
with the political patronage and lack of independence of most regulatory agencies from 
government influence on its daily activity. Anganye and Gwilliam (2008), posits that there is 
a desire to adopt and implement regulatory framework as practised in western world 
economies, however the enforcement mechanisms of corporate governance in Nigeria are 
weak or non-existent. 
In spite of these challenges however, the Banking industry has recorded growth in terms of 
aggregate market capitalisation for listed securities. The All Share Index dropped by 26.6% at 
the end of December 2014. As a result of the bearish conditions in the capital market, market 
capitalisation declined from NGN 13.23 trillion (USD 82.8 billion) at the end of December 
2013 to NGN 11.5 trillion (USD 68.3 billion) at end December 2014. The decline in equities 
market performance was largely due to increased capital outflows, as some foreign investors 
sold off their assets amidst concerns over currency depreciation in the face of steady declines 
in external reserves and global oil prices and it represents the largest industry capitalisation 
on the Nigerian stock exchange accounting for 78% of the capitalisation on the stock 
exchange and been the main tool for economic development (Soludo, 2008; SEC, 2014). 
Despite these achievements however, the problem of corporate governance and 
accountability has remained a recurring problem for the industry as attempts at reform have 
not yielded the desires result thus requiring a need for examining the model the country has 
adopted to regulate corporate governance for possible areas of improvement and redesign. 
5. Cases, Analysis and Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
This section examines the cases selected for examination in the Nigerian banking industry 
Intercontinental bank PLC and Oceanic Bank Plc. it will highlight corporate governance 
issues that contributed to the collapse of these banks. Implications of other issues considered 
in the literature review will be discussed. The first part gives a brief overview of the cases 
study Intercontinental Bank PLC and Oceanic Bank plc selected based on their size and 
amount of exposure to bad loans and the fact that they were previously family owned banks 
which enables a comparism to be drawn on the effectiveness of codes of governance 
introduced in 2006. 
5.2The Case of Intercontinental Bank PLC 
Intercontinental Bank PLC was established in February 1989 as part of the banking 
liberalisation policy of the post Structural Adjustment era. Initially, the bank was 
incorporated   as Nigerian Intercontinental Merchant Bank Ltd. the bank was established with 
a capital of 12million as a private limited company it was listed on the stock exchange in 
January 2003. During the Nigerian banking consolidation exercise of 2006 Intercontinental 
bank integrated subsidiaries previously controlled as distinct entities Global Bank, Equity 
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Bank and Gateway Bank.  The bank indeed had a seamless integration and was awarded the 
CBN price for successfully completing its integration in record time. The reason was that 
Intercontinental bank already held controlling interests in these and the managing director 
Erastus Akingbola was a director in each of these subsidiary banks. 
The bank, consequently, expanded rapidly between 2005 and 2008.  For instance, from an 
asset base of about N200 billion, profit before tax of below N10billion, and deposit base of 
slightly over N100 billion, in 2005, Intercontinental Bank Plc’s   declared results for the 
2006/07 financial year showed a profit before tax of N21.5billion (the highest amount 
declared in the Nigerian banking industry, total assets of N663.5 billion and total deposits of 
N455.7billion, clearly placing it among the top five in the industry (Intercontinental bank Plc 
2008). As of December 2008, the last financial report prior to the Central bank Intervention, 
the bank had a Profit before tax of 22.114billion and a 95% growth in profit. In fact, as at 
August 14 2009, the bank had customer deposits of N1.1trillion, the highest of the five banks 
affected by the CBN's action.  It, also, had the highest total assets of N1.7trillion and with 
354 branches-the second highest branch net work among the five institutions with foreign 
offices in the UK following it’s meeting the requirements for Financial Services Authority 
banking license for foreign bank subsidiary to operate in the United Kingdom.(Business 
Hallmark September 21,2009;Meristem Securities 2009, NSE fact Book 2008) 
The Managing Director served as the president of Chartered Institute of Bankers Nigeria and 
was also Vice president of Nigerian Stock Exchange with a clear succession plan to emerge 
as the next president of the Nigerian Stock exchange (NSE annual report 2007). In 
recognition of the bank’s growth, it was nominated in partnership with BNP Paribas to 
manage Nigeria’s foreign reserves. Notable among investors in the bank was AIG global 
Emerging Markets Fund II (Sponsored by the AIG fund a subsidiary of the AIG insurance 
firm) 
In spite of its rapid growth, there were significant doubts raised about the financial statements 
and it profits declared. In reviewing, Intercontinental Bank's target to be the “number one 
financial institution in Nigeria, among the top five in Africa and the top 500 in the world-
measured in terms of total assets, ROE and/or profit before tax-within three years”, JP 
Morgan states “…. we view the three-year time frame as unrealistic and we are concerned 
that management may be drawn into focusing on balance sheet growth at the expense of 
profitability” 
Several media awards noted Intercontinental Bank's record in corporate governance as one of 
the best in the industry although this view has been found to be doubtful with subsequent 
allegations of share manipulation, money laundering and financial statement frauds that was 
perpetuated during the period 2004 to 2009 
Hallmark (September 2009:3) suggests that the MD of intercontinental bank had an 
overbearing influence on the board it notes from a bank analyst, 
 “Dr. Akingbola was probably the only bank Chief executive that was a member of his 
bank's audit committee”.  His word was law and nobody dared question him; the bank 
probably had one of the highest staff turnover rates in the sector” Hallmark 2009. The 
audit committee and board was reflected in an inability for any form of internal audit 
report questioning the transfers or schemes of share buy back” 
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 To achieve this, the bank engaged a network of related companies and subsidiaries with 
substantial holdings in the Akingbola family name. To Lord Justice Burton, 
“………the tropics payment claims relates to a total of 
=N=18,684,500.00  is paid in respect of moneys paid by the 
claimant(Intercontinental bank PLC) to or to the benefit of various 
companies in the tropics group of which the defendant (E.Akingbola)was 
a director; which he and or his wife or family directly or indirectly 
owed” 
These payments while expressly prohibited by various sections of CAMA 1990. Section 160 
provides  
  “a company may not purchase or otherwise acquire shares issued by it “ 
Section 159 similarly states that  
“a company is prohibited from providing financial assistance to companies or 
individuals directly or indirectly for acquisition of company own shares” 
However contrary to these provisions the bank granted loans to staff members and members 
of the public to acquire it share and deliberately used a share by back scheme to manipulate it 
share price over a period of four years from available records. Hence the mechanism of 
control designed to protect shareholders and guarantee independence of the auditors was high 
jacked by a dominant MD CEO. This is to prevent questioning of actions by the board on one 
hand and to prevent the functioning of internal control and audit mechanism aimed at 
protecting shareholders. 
In summary the main issues form the case of intercontinental bank are the issues of non 
independence of directors cross directorship, money laundering, use of a network of related 
party company, non-disclosure of interests in related parties and use of professionals to divert 
depositors funds. 
5.3 Oceanic bank PLC 
Oceanic bank was incorporated in 1990 as a family owned bank with interests in the oil 
corporate banking and retail banking segments in the Nigeria. It commenced operations with 
an initial capital of 20million on April 10 1990 and was incorporated on the Nigerian stock 
exchange May 24, 2004(SEC 2008). 
The CEO of Oceanic bank Plc Mrs Ibru started as a head of administration and rose through 
the ranks to become the MD/ CEO in 1997(Otusanya,2010).  As at the time of its intervention, 
Mrs Ibru controlled over 35% of the bank through Special Purpose Vehicles(SPV)which were 
funded with customer deposits to acquire assets and also manipulate its shares Sanusi, (2009). 
The main breach of corporate governance practise at Oceanic banks were cases of insider 
related loans and related party transactions in the acquisition of assets to shell companies and 
family members under Mrs Ibru extends beyond insider related loans and unauthorised 
credits. As MD, contrary to the code of Governance the MD CEO through directly or 
indirectly controlled subsidiaries awarded supply and procurement contracts at the bank to 
these connected firms at non arm length terms. She is alleged to owe the numerous 
companies that sold or rented real estate properties to the bank and provided manpower at 
above market rate while paying basic wage to clerks, cleaners and drivers. 
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In some of these instances, Mrs Ibru was said to have sold or leased property to the bank 
through her own firms or those in which she had substantial interests, at inflated rates. A 
particularly shocking accusation by enraged staffers claims that she paid herself agency 
commissions on Ibru family properties designated for her official use as MD CEO.(Economy, 
2009) Since she was CEO and a member of the powerful family with a major shareholding, 
an ex-staff alludes “she exercised unrestrained approval rights with minimal delegation of 
function”.  Among the charges to which Mrs Ibru pled guilty was the allegation that her 
personal residence in Nigeria’s commercial centre was leased to the bank for a cumulative 
term of eight and half years until 2017 at the sum of N225 million paid in full and she 
received agency commission for the transaction.  
Unchallenged, the MD in abuse of the banks and CBN prudential guidance on credit  
facilities, repeatedly exceeded credit approval limits approving loans above her N1 billion 
statutory limit in breach of the Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) cap B3, 
2004 and section 422 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap C38, laws of the Federation.(The 
Economy September 2009) In most cases these loans were granted for her personal use 
through bogus companies, relatives, cronies and for investment in other companies. (The 
Economy, September 2009). As at the time of CBN intervention, the Bank had a non-
performing loan portfolio of =N=620billion with majority being insider related to firms 
owned or controlled by the Ibru family. Sanusi (2009) states that over 75% of the non-
performing loans in Oceanic are directly related to companies owned or controlled by the 
Ibru family. 
 
5.4 Issues of governance and evaluation of the weakness of the CBN 2006 code of 
governance  
5.4.1Ownership structure. 
The code of governance makes it mandatory that government ownership in banks shall not 
exceed 10% while that of individuals may exceed 5% subject to the approval of the CBN. 
This requirement though in place was abused buy the use of shell companies and related 
parties to acquire dominant shareholdings in both banks. However, as with legal provisions 
the code falls short of what is defined as extended family. In the case of Oceanic bank two 
family members were on the board Mrs Ibru and Mr Oboden Ibru as a Non-executive 
member.  There is a need to update the provisions of the code to provide for what is classified 
as family membership as opposed from the traditional father, Mother Children relationship 
definition of a family which has been used to breach this provision of the code. The code thus 
has made provisions for agency relationship problems associated with dispersed ownership 
without providing for concentrated owner manager problems that may arise where ownership 
structure is dominated by few individuals. 
5.4.2 Remuneration 
As part of the regulations introduced to prevent excessive remuneration to members of the 
board, non-executive directors’ remuneration is restricted to: sitting allowances, directors’ 
fees, reimbursable travel expenses and hotel expenses as may be determined by the 
shareholders at annual general meetings. However as noted by Otusanya,(2011), the 
independent directors were paid $10000.00 as holiday expenses in a country where the 
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minimum wage is $1350 per annum and majority of the population surviving on less 
that$2.00 per day ( BBC 10.01.2012). Similarly, board members were similarly paid profit 
sharing bonus in clear disregard of the provisions of the code. These payments, contrary to 
the code of governance were not approved by shareholders and represent a means by which 
professional managers can influence and capture the non-executive directors. This results in a 
limit to their independence to serve as a check on managers’ activities. This also indicates the 
role of cronyism in fixing remuneration as non-executive directors are responsible for fixing 
executive remuneration. As regard this feature there is no mechanism in place for monitoring 
or enforcing this provision. Banks are not required for instance to submit remuneration 
structure for approval neither is there a requirement to disclose details of allowances that are 
paid to directors during a financial year. A recent trend is to class some categories of senior 
managers as consultants whose remuneration and compensation is not required to be 
disclosed as employees on the financial statement thus restricting disclosures to directors fees. 
5.4.3 Non-disclosure of interest in related party transactions   
Tropics finance (a connected third party was used to acquire these shares) was owed by all 
respect by Mr Akinngbola and a director in charge of investments as a ED both at 
Intercontinental bank Plc and Tropics Finance Ltd. In spite of the fact that these transactions 
were in breach of the law the share buy back scheme was carried out without the process for 
approvalof purchase of company own shares. The normal process requires prior approval of 
the board, Shareholders at an AGM and regulatory approval from Securities and Exchange 
Commission. This was not done and this was not also flagged as a corporate governance and 
legal infraction by the audit process (internal or external). 
5.4.4 Fraudulent Financial reporting and False rendition of regulatory returns 
The growth of the bank can be traced to series of fraudulent financial reporting that took 
place from its listing in 2003 till the CBN intervention of 2009.  As testified by the former 
director there existed a black box to which losses incurred from the deliberate prop up of the 
shares of the bank was warehoused by the bank. A mail from the banks Securities dealing 
services department (SDS) to the Group executive dated May 15, 2004 alludes to this by 
recommending 
 “before we resume direct intervention … we need to manage our tradable 
volumes in the market better, as this is another area through which the price of 
our Bank remains depressed. This can be achieved through moral suasion and 
also discrete buy-back/buy-out agreements with such volume holders 
especially those in-House2” 
by stating “before we resume” the correspondence pre-supposes the manipulation existed 
prior to the e-mail date (May 15, 2004.)  The fraud spanned over a period of five years, 
unreported or detected by auditors, finance analysts and regulators. It is difficult to assume 
that such fraud or schemes can be concealed without the connivance of auditors or at best 
                                                          
2 It is worthy to note that through a network of associated share brokers funds (in the form of margin finance 
loan” was made available to drive up the share prices on the Nigerian stock exchange. Reference to “in house” 
indicates the Stockbroking arm of the Bank” 
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negligence on the part of auditors and regulators. It is worthy of note that two different set of 
professional audit firms examined the bank’s books on three occasions of  public share 
offering(between 2005 and 2010) as reporting auditors and accountants. This raises the 
question of the effectiveness of audit models and reliability of auditors’ opinion for reaching 
investment decisions or as a tool of assessing management’s extent of compliance to the code 
of governance. These manipulations (or governance lapses) were not totally concealed as JP 
Morgan raised reservations in a review of Intercontinental banks financial statement where a 
75% increase in share price was recorded. It expressed “Intercontinetal’s rapid pace of 
growth has run ahead of its risk and credit capability…..”  the same reservation was not 
noticed by auditors and regulators in their annual audits, thus raising questions on the extent 
of quality in discharging their oversight roles. Also, the roles of professional as accountants 
and lawyers in designing a complex wave of transactions calls to doubt their independence in 
discharging their roles in within these banks.  
Similarly, the cases presented highlight selective valuation of loan portfolio by banks. These 
valuations were done without recourse to either the Nigerian accounting standards or CBN 
prudential guidelines which requires varying provisions required for various levels of bank 
credit. By classifying bad and or non-performing loans as if they were performing, banks 
were able to declare ‘super profits’ used to portray growth while further expropriating other 
share holders. As such super profits formed the basis on which dividends and performance 
bonuses are paid directors directly benefit from such wrong loan classifications. In most cases, 
these “paper profits” were converted to share loans without consent of shareholder. Where 
consent was obtained a review of shareholding rights indicate the existence of significant 
control by a group (proxies or cronies) of the shareholders. Hence these banks where able to 
circumvent governance provisions on disclosure of related party and making false renditions 
on financial statement positions. This calls as a whole to question the efficiency and technical 
competence of the board and audit committee as it indicates they were subject to 
manipulation and intimidation by dominant managers or group of shareholders. Although the 
code of governance has detailed responsibilities and functions of board members and 
organisational structures, in practise there is a failure to comply with them. This indicates the 
establishment of the governance structure is not aimed at fostering accountability but to 
legitimise the banks for continued existence. 
5.4.5 Regulatory failure  
 These cases indicate a trend of reactive regulation as opposed to a proactive risk based 
assessment of banks. To regulate a banking industry requires constant changes and prudential 
guidelines as economic and social indices change or infractions become known. From the 
initial inception of the mandatory code of governance for Nigerian banks in 2006 to 
September 2009 the CBN has issued no update(s) to the code or circular to update same. 
Sanusi (2009:9) asserts “of the 313 circulars issued by the CBN from January 2008 none 
addressed issues of corporate governance”. This indicates a regulatory body that ignored the 
tendency for regulatory arbitrage and malpractices prevalent in the banking industry.  During 
the period 2006-2009 there were significant changes that called for a proactive re-assessment 
of prevailing corporate framework for banks. These changes included the global financial 
crises and its effect of loss of FDI in the country, the growth of institutional investors as a 
result of the 2004 Nigerian pension reforms act that licensed pension fund administrators to 
invest in the Nigerian capital market. However, the regulatory bodiesi were in most cases 
working at cross purposes without joint examinations allowing for regulatory arbitrage. 
Sanusi (2009:10) suggests that lack of proper regulatory structure defining roles and 
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accountability of functions made for poor and ineffective supervision and enforcement of 
sanctions. The approach to governance    regulation indicates a market based approached as 
opposed to a regulatory led approach thus allowing for corporate governance failures.   
CAC for instance in addition to it role of registering companies is expected to serve as a 
repository for corporate information and records of all incorporated companies in Nigeria. 
Peel (2006:34) however notes “at CAC it is difficult if not impossible to obtain information 
on numbers of directorship an individual holds and with which company(ies)”  this was 
exploited in both cases as related party transactions were concealed using multiple names or 
combination of names without detection by regulatory bodies, auditors or shareholders.  
6. Summary and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary  
The recent global financial crises and Nigerian banking crises has shown that corporate 
governance of financial institutions requires more research both in emerging and developed 
countries. The role of the financial crises has been identified as a major cause of these crises 
as evidenced in liquidation and losses suffered as a result of bank liquidation or government 
bailout of banks. The emerging body of literature in Nigeria is yet to focus significant 
attention on corporate governance banks. Studies of this nature are required to address the 
specific peculiarities of opaqueness and regulatory supervision identified in the literature as 
distinguishing banks from other forms of businesses. 
This paper has reviewed the practice of corporate governance in emerging markets using 
Nigerian banking industry as a case study. A review of the literature indicates that while there 
is a large body of literature on corporate governance practices in western and emerged market 
economies less literature is available in emerging markets. A study of this nature in a context 
of other emerging countries may enable comparism across emerging markets.  Future studies 
may consider adopting a different method of data collection such as more interviews and use 
of observation to understand the operation of some of the noted mechanisms in practise. 
Similarly, it will yield additional insight if studies are carried out over a longer time frame 
through the use of longitudinal studies and or archival studies to explore how these practices 
evolve over time. 
6.2 Contribution of the study  
 Clarke (2005) suggests the pattern of economic crises indicates that there is a cyclical trend 
in financial crises and regulation. As the global economy recovers from the 2007 to 2010 
crises this study has highlighted the need for improved governance and regulatory monitoring 
of banks in emerging markets. Banks play a cardinal role in emerging markets hence there is 
a need for a separate model of governance to apply as opposed to that of conventional public 
corporation.  
Similarly, this study has also contributed to the increasing body of literature in corporate 
governance with a focus on bank corporate governance practises and bank failure  
6.3 Limitations of the study 
The study was limited to the mandatory code of corporate governance for Nigerian banks 
issued in 2006. There is a need to examine other codes of  corporate governance  enacted by 
regulators in  Nigerian banking industry these include SEC code of 2003 (as amended in 
2011) to assess the extent of compliance with these codes. This study has adopted a 
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documentary analysis and use of secondary data to reach it conclusions. An empirical study 
to better understand multiple perspectives to the study of governance and its influences on 
governance process may have yield more evidence and opinion upon which conclusions are 
drawn. 
6.4 Suggestions for further studies  
This study has adopted a case study analysis with a documentary form of data another study 
might aim to carry out research using a structured interview to enable data from wider and 
multiple sources to aid the analysis. This study has reviewed practice of corporate governance 
in emerging markets using Nigerian banking industry as a case study. A review of the 
literature indicates there is a large body of literature on corporate governance practices in 
western and emerged market economies and less literature is available in emerging markets. 
A study of this nature in a context of other emerging countries may enable future researcher 
to compare the trend across emerging markets.  Future studies may consider adopting varied 
methods of data collections as interview and use of observation to understand the operation of 
some of the noted mechanisms in the banking industry. This is however not expected to be 
generalisable as the influences will differ based on diverse country and institutional 
influences. 
6.5 Final remarks 
This study has used a case study and documentary analysis to examine corporate governance 
practises in the context of emerging countries. It has used the corporate governance practices 
adopted in the Nigerian banking industry for the purposes of the study. The literature review 
indicates an emerging body of literature in the broad area of corporate governance in 
developing economies especially those in Asia and Africa. Focus of this study tends to be 
mainly at the country level or a comparative study of western models mechanisms of 
corporate governance. 
  
Similarly, the Nigerian banking is faced by multiple issues of governance ranging from non-
disclosure of information and The analysis indicates that corporate governance models used 
in developed countries though touted as by multinational agencies as World bank and IMF 
may not be suitable in addressing the country specific governance needs, and serves as a 
limitation on comparative studies of corporate governance (Mensah 2002; Adegbite 2010; 
Armstrong and Guay,2016).  
For successful corporate governance systems to be built there is a need to consider the 
political, economic, technological and cultural differences (Rabelo & Vasconcelos, 2002). 
Where the existing model is unable to address the peculiar problems in a sector, consideration 
s models of corporate governance that consider the conditions in each 
Developing country and that are not directly borrowed from developed countries. 
The issues identified in this paper can form a research topic for future researchers on 
corporate governance in countries to include other specific industries as insurance, oil and gas 
as opposed to a general study at the country level. 
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